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DOES POWER CORRUPT? THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE USA PATRIOT ACT

A. Civil Liberties and Police Forces
The conflict between the need to be secure and the need to be
free is not new. When England debated the establishment of its first
modern police force in 1829, opponents expressed their fear of an
omnipresent police force that would curtail civil liberties and usurp
1
the role of judge and jury.
The concerns arising 180 years ago have since crossed the Atlantic and emerged again and again in American debates about the
2
proper limits of the role of law enforcement. Those debates have
3
remained largely unchanged in form and content over the decades.
While commentators and members of the media debate the balance between liberty and security, the nation’s lawmakers are again
considering whether to extend statutory provisions that give intelligence agencies sweeping domestic power to encroach on the civil
4
liberties of citizens. The conversations occurring in Washington,
D.C., about oversight of federal law enforcement agencies such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation bear striking resemblances to
1. POLICE ASSESSMENT RES. CTR., REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICE OVERSIGHT MODELS
5 (2005), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/Eugene/Review%20of%20
National%20Police%20Oversight%20Models%20%28Feb.%202005%29.pdf (tracing
the development of the principles of limited police power that were later adopted by
the New York City Police Department and other American police forces).
2. Id. at 6. Among the principles that the British Parliament adopted when it
established the police force is one that echoes the civilian oversight values of today:
“To recognize the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is
dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behavior, and on their
ability to secure and maintain public respect.” Id. at 5–6.
3. See SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT
20 (Wadsworth 2001) (detailing a history of police actions that have given rise to calls
for civilian oversight); see also ZENITH GROSS & ALAN REITMAN, POLICE POWER AND
CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW BOARD 33 (1966)
(pamphlet published by the American Civil Liberties Union, including a history of
extant civilian police review boards and the community incidents that gave rise to a
movement to install a citizen review board); Mary M. Cheh, Legislative Oversight of
Police: Lessons Learned From an Investigation of Police Handling of Demonstrations in
Washington, D.C., 32 J. LEGIS. 1, 3–6 (2005) (reviewing the history of police clashes
with protestors following meetings of international trade organizations and steps
taken to install citizen oversight mechanisms to address critical incidents).
4. See, e.g., Editorial, Patriot Act Excesses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at A38; Ellen
Nakashima & Carrie Johnson, Partial Patriot Act Extension is Approved by Senate Panel,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2009, at A1 (advocating a review of the PATRIOT Act, particularly
to address missing civil liberties and privacy protections).
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longstanding discussions that have occurred in American cities about
how to oversee municipal police departments.
5
America’s police officers are subjected to administrative, judi6
7
cial, and political scrutiny and oversight. In America’s largest
cities—and now, increasingly in its mid-sized cities—the police are
frequently watched over by civilian agencies established to respond to
8
instances of police misconduct.
The purpose of this paper is to present some reflections on what
U.S. cities have learned about managing their police departments
through the civilian oversight process and whether such a model of
law enforcement oversight has any applications for the oversight of
federal law enforcement agencies.
This paper examines the successes and failures of America’s cities
in instituting external civilian police oversight functions. It then looks
at the strengths and weaknesses of current mechanisms the federal
government has in place to check the powers of federal law enforcement. Finally, the paper ends with a proposal for how a system of
civilian oversight —inspired by the models used in American cities—
might function at a federal level.
Although civilian oversight of police is not a panacea, this paper
proposes that it is a system with several qualities that can be put to
profitable use. As policymakers work to create a more robust system
of federal oversight, the lessons cities have learned in implementing
civilian review suggest helpful solutions and admonish against making
certain mistakes.
B. The Growing Concern Over Federal Abuses of Power
On April 27, 2005, then-U.S. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee and assured
lawmakers—who were considering whether to approve changes to the
9
USA PATRIOT Act —that “there has not been one verified case of
5. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 172 (1993).
6. Id. at 193.
7. Id. at 185.
8. National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, Resources,
http://www.nacole.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=57
(last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (listing all U.S. cities with a civilian oversight agency as well
as foreign nations with some form of civilian oversight).
9. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter the PATRIOT Act].
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civil liberties abuse” by federal agents under the provisions of the
10
act. In fact, at the time of the attorney general’s testimony, he had
received reports of at least a half-dozen episodes of legal or procedural violations that were enabled by the expanded authority given to
11
federal agents through the PATRIOT Act.
Three months after Gonzales’s testimony, Congress re-upped the
PATRIOT Act, making permanent many of the statute’s provisions
that had been hastily prepared in response to the terrorist attacks of
12
September 11, 2001. In 2007, an internal audit at the FBI revealed
more than 1,000 instances of violations of law or agency rules while
13
collecting data about phone calls, e-mails, and financial transactions.
The audit examined only ten percent of the agency’s national-security
investigations conducted since 2002, suggesting that the actual
number of violations exceeded, by orders of magnitude, those that
14
were known.
Moreover, the audit was confined to domestic
surveillance investigations, leaving out a generous swathe of other law
15
enforcement activities in which the agency engages.
C. The Balance Between Power and Oversight
It is axiomatic that an increase in a government’s power to affect
the civil rights of its citizens will also be accompanied by increased
16
opportunities for abuses of such authority. Through the auspices of
the PATRIOT Act, the U.S. government endeavors to “deter and
punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world [and]
17
to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools. . . .” Among the
tools employed by the PATRIOT Act to accomplish its purpose is
increasing opportunities for government surveillance of electronic
10. John Solomon, Gonzales Was Told of FBI Violations, WASH. POST, July 10, 2007,
at A1.
11. Id. (“The acts recounted in the FBI reports included unauthorized
surveillance, an illegal property search and a case in which an Internet firm
improperly turned over a compact disc with data that the FBI was not entitled to
collect. . . .”).
12. Eric Lichtblau, Senate Makes Permanent Nearly All Provisions of the Patriot Act,
With a Few Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A1.
13. John Solomon, FBI Finds It Frequently Overstepped in Collecting Data, WASH.
POST, June 14, 2007, at A1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 8 (describing how the work environment of
policing creates ample opportunities for abuses of citizens, either as a result of an
honest misjudgment or from evil motives).
17. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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18

communications of U.S. citizens, giving government officials greater
19
authority to monitor and intercede in private banking transactions,
20
and allowing government access to citizens’ library records. The
beneficiaries of the PATRIOT Act’s largesse are federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including the FBI, which are charged
21
with using their enhanced powers to fight terrorism.
With some exceptions, commentators do not dispute that the
United States government was correct in bolstering the power of its
law enforcement agencies in light of the threats to national security
22
that have become tragically salient over the last decade. But the
expansion of federal law enforcement powers has not been accompa18. Tammy J. Schemmel, WWW.STOPCYBERCRIME.COM: How the USA PATRIOT
Act Combats Cyber-Crime, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 921, 926 (2003). Schemmel notes
that the PATRIOT Act allows law enforcement enhanced access to electronic
communications by eliminating the jurisdictional boundaries of courts that had
prevented internet service providers from handing over information. One of the
purposes of this paper is to address the risks of misconduct that are raised by the
destruction of those jurisdictional boundaries. Id.
19. Paul Schott Stevens & Thomas C. Bogle, Patriotic Acts: Financial Institutions,
Money Laundering and the War Against Terrorism, 21 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 261, 262
(2002).
20. Heather Hillary & Nancy Kubasek, The Remaining Perils of the Patriot Act: A
Primer, 8 J. L. SOC’Y 1, 7 (2007) (“This clause of [the PATRIOT Act] causes concern
among citizens because the government need only claim they are demanding the
records because of anything involving terrorism, and the records must be handed
over without the citizen ever knowing.”). At present, the U. S. Senate is considering
revisions to the PATRIOT Act that would curtail the authority of intelligence agencies
to request library records and records of consumer purchasing habits without a more
thorough accounting for the need to access the information. See Evan Perez, Patriot
Act Redo Clears Split Panel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2009, at A4, infra note 24 (discussing
potential revisions to the PATRIOT act pending before the Senate).
21. Although this paper tends to scrutinize the FBI, as will be discussed below,
the problems and principles of misconduct and oversight are not confined to a single
federal law enforcement agency.
22. Compare Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175, 179
(2003) (“[T]he nation’s security ultimately must be a priority, and a condition
precedent toward securing civil liberties. When the nation is secure, its people are
secure and when a nation is under attack, civil liberties become secondary to national
security.”), with Hillary & Kubasek, supra note 20, at 74 (“It is understandably
necessary that in times when national security is at risk, the government will be
granted more powers, further reach, and access to more information, but there needs
to be a limit on these powers and necessary measures in place to prevent an abuse of
this power.”). But see Anne Uyeda, The USA Patriot Act May Infringe on Civil Liberties in
Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, n.1 (2002) (“Although ostensibly designed in
response to the events of September 11th, most of the bill’s provisions actually have
more of an impact on the lives of innocent Americans, rather than hostile terrorists.
By endowing domestic and national law enforcement agencies with an expansive
power to spy on the on-line activities of people, the government may well have
sacrificed the privacy rights of individuals in its quest to protect the nation.”).
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23

nied by a commensurate expansion in oversight. From involvement
in acts of torture to retaliation against whistleblowers, the FBI is
increasingly subject to public criticism and efforts by legislators to
address and prevent ethical and civil liberties violations by reforming
24
institutional oversight.
Two core assumptions must be challenged and modified to bring
oversight to such organizations as the FBI: first, that unobstructed
broad authority is required to achieve absolute security; and second,
that security considerations are always incompatible with and superior
25
to preservation of individual rights.
But, as discussed below, many American cities have attempted to
address analogous assumptions on the local level to bring external
oversight to their police departments. The conversations occurring in
American cities may provide fruitful information for the national
dialogue on intelligence and federal law enforcement oversight.
II. CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE POLICE
A. The Growth and Current Status of Civilian Oversight in the United
States
Civilian oversight is defined as “a procedure through which the
investigation and disposition of citizen complaints against police
officers that involves some input from individuals who are not
26
themselves sworn officers.”
23. Electronic
Privacy
Information
Center,
USA
Patriot
Act,
http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) (“[The
PATRIOT Act] introduced a plethora of legislative changes which significantly
increased the surveillance and investigative powers of law enforcement agencies in
the United States. The Act did not, however, provide for the system of checks and
balances that traditionally safeguards civil liberties in the face of such legislation.”).
24. See, e.g., Perez, supra note 20, at A4 (“The bill approved Thursday includes
new court oversight and additional administrative steps that terrorism investigators
have to comply with.”); Charlie Savage, Panel Votes on Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2009, at A16 (“In its current form, the Senate bill would impose stronger oversight
safeguards on the FBI’s use of these and related powers, such as by requiring new
audits by the Justice Department’s inspector general. The bill would also cause several
Patriot Act powers to expire after another four years without further legislation; a
measure intended to ensure that lawmakers will continue to monitor how the powers
are being used.”).
25. See ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE FBI & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF CRITICAL
HISTORY 172 (University Press of Kansas 2004).
26. Justina R. Cintron Perino, Developments in Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement,
36 URB. LAW. 387, 388 (2004) (quoting Samuel Walker’s definition of citizen
oversight).
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In practical terms, a civilian oversight agency includes a staff of
investigators, an ombudsman, or citizen adjudicators who are
27
unaffiliated with the police department. Their role is to determine
whether an officer committed misconduct, or to determine whether a
misconduct investigation was carried out thoroughly and without
28
bias.
The concept of civilian oversight of the police began in the
29
1920s —and may have roots even further back than that. In 1928,
the Los Angeles Bar Association created a committee staffed by
volunteer lawyers who investigated allegations of police misconduct
and referred meritorious complaints to the Los Angeles Police
30
Department for further investigation. Civilian oversight agencies
emerged in the 1950s and the 1960s, with widespread establishment
31
of the agencies occurring as a reaction to the civil rights movement.
However, the luster of civilian oversight began to fade by the late
1960s, when many perceived the approach to be unhelpful and
32
ineffective. Nevertheless, the movement began picking up steam
33
again in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Today, besides being a
34
fixture in most American cities, civilian oversight has spread
35
overseas. The use of civilian oversight of the police in Northern
Ireland is widely credited with being a key tool supporting the
36
reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics.
Notably, the
27. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 5, at 223 (noting that the categorization of a
civilian review authority depends on whether a police officer or a civilian conducts
the initial fact-finding, whether a police officer or civilian reviews the product of the
investigation, whether the complainant has the right to appeal, and whether the chief
of police is required to impose discipline).
28. Id. at 224.
29. WALKER, supra note 3, at 20.
30. Id.
31. Perino, supra note 26, at 387–88.
32. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 30–31 (explaining that in New York during the
1960s civilian oversight hampered police efforts, and, consequently, police brutality
for the sake of crime control and community safety was deemed tolerable).
33. Perino, supra note 26, at 388.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING BOARD (Belfast, N. Ir.), THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF THE FIRST NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING BOARD 4 NOVEMBER 2001 – 31 MARCH 2006
(2006), available at http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/achievementdoc-2.pdf
(observing that civilian oversight of the police has played a particularly prominent
role in Northern Ireland); see also Shannon McNulty, Building Trust in Northern Ireland:
The Role of Civilian Review of the Police, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 231–40
(2002) (discussing the status of the national civilian review authority shortly after it
had been implemented, and how reconciliation between the Catholic and Protestant
populations has been linked to the successful operation of the Northern Ireland
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Northern Ireland Policing Board has a national jurisdiction and its
duties extend to monitoring anti-terrorist investigations by the
national police, serving as evidence that civilians can oversee national
37
police agencies and have access to sensitive information.
Civilian oversight comes in two general types: the investigatory
38
model and the audit model. These models are further divided into
classes. Class I agencies (which are always investigatory-model
agencies) are completely independent of the police department—
receiving, investigating, and adjudicating complaints of police
39
misconduct. Class I agencies are staffed by non-sworn personnel and
40
are fiscally and statutorily separate from the police department.
Class II, III, and IV agencies have varying levels of connection to the
41
police department. These types of agencies are usually classed as
audit-type agencies because they rarely conduct independent
42
Instead, audit-model agency personnel review
investigations.
individual complaints investigated by the police department’s internal
affairs unit, serve as appellate bodies for citizens dissatisfied with the
internal affairs investigation, and monitor the policies and procedures
of the police department, providing recommendations for improved
43
operation. Class V agencies use a hybridized version of an audit and
investigative model, where non-sworn personnel are hired and housed
44
within the police department to adjudicate misconduct complaints.
The individual powers of the oversight agencies vary from city to
45
city. Some civilian oversight agencies have the authority to issue
46
subpoenas, although this tends to be a rare power. At least one
review authority, although lacking subpoena power, requires police

Policing Board).
37. Id.
38. See Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 151, 163 (2003) (explaining the different models of civilian
review boards for police oversight).
39. Perino, supra note 26, at 388.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 388–89.
42. See id. at 389 (stating that these agencies “review, monitor, or audit the police
department’s complaint process.”).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. PETER FINN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CITIZEN REVIEW OF POLICE:
APPROACHES AND IMPLEMENTATION (2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/184430.pdf (describing the major models of civilian oversight agencies and
reviewing which cities have adopted which models).
46. See Perino, supra note 26, at 389–90.
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officers to comply with investigations as a condition of employment.

47

B. The Perceived Benefits of Civilian Oversight
There are more than 100 civilian oversight agencies in the United States covering about eighty percent of the largest cities and
48
serving nearly one-third of the American population. As Jerome
Skolnick and James Fyfe observe, the underlying attraction to civilian
oversight is plain:
[W]hen citizens ask for review of police conduct by civilians,
they do so because they don’t trust the police to investigate
themselves. The demand for civilian review thus implies a
failure of police administration that . . . probably cannot be
put right simply by employing more responsive administrators. . . . Like the institution of the jury, which arose not because judges were incompetent to hear and evaluate
evidence and reach verdicts, but because judges were mi49
strusted, so too with civilian review of police misconduct.
A police department’s internal affairs unit, operating on its own,
lacks the credibility to conduct an independent investigation that is
50
satisfactory to the community. Minneapolis city council members, in
an attempt to assuage community members and preserve their own
51
political futures, established the city’s review authority. In theory, at
least, a system of civilian oversight inserts into the police investigation
process a watchman without allegiance to the police who will ensure
52
that the investigation is conducted without bias. This, in turn,
generally supports a perception by the community that its police
53
department is operating with a proper respect for individual rights.
As a result, a greater level of trust develops between the police and the

47. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 172.180 (2005).
48. WALKER, supra note 3, at 6.
49. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 5, at 224.
50. See id. (“Cops are not trusted to investigate other cops, even when they are
perfectly capable of doing so . . . Mistrust of authorities has less to do with their
competence than with their values, inclinations, and prior commitments, and with how
these are perceived by those outside their organizations.”).
51. MICHAEL K. BROWNE, A STUDY OF THE POLICY AND PROCESS OF THE MINNEAPOLIS
CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY 6 (2006) (on file with the author).
52. DOUGLAS W. PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUT POLICE REVIEW 125 (1994)
(“[T]he central theme of the discussion of those who favor civilian review is
intuitively persuasive; some external perspective should be brought to bear on the
investigation and deliberation of allegations of police misconduct, or the police will
be left to police themselves.”)
53. Id.
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community that ultimately greases the cogs of crime detection and
54
prevention.
There are other benefits that municipalities enjoy when establishing a system of citizen oversight. Chief among them is the political
coverage that the city’s elected officials receive when establishing the
55
agency.
For example, the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review
Authority came into being in 1990 after police officers identified the
56
wrong house in a drug raid. During the course of the botched raid,
57
the police killed an elderly couple who lived in the house. In
another episode not long after, the Minneapolis Police Department
broke up a peaceful party of college-aged African Americans at a
58
Minneapolis hotel.
In response to both incidents, outraged
community members engaged in vehement and highly publicized
59
demonstrations.
Besides providing a measure of political coverage, citizen over60
sight may also operate as a mechanism for saving cities money.
Wronged citizens, instead of bringing their grievances to court, enter
the civilian oversight system where they may achieve redress that ends
up costing the city nothing more than the administrative costs of the
61
investigation.
Civilian oversight also plays another important role for U.S. police departments: it helps departments avoid, or end up being subject
to, consent decrees that hand over departmental management to the
62
U.S. Department of Justice. Under federal law, it is unlawful for a
54. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1159–60 (2000)
(“[P]opular mistrust of government undermines the perceived legitimacy of the law,
which in turn reduces public compliance with legal commands . . . . A government
that cannot inspire obedience will likely be impotent in all but its ministerial
functions. . . .”).
55. Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 20 (2003).
56. MICHAEL K. BROWNE, A STUDY OF THE POLICY AND PROCESS OF THE MINNEAPOLIS
CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY 6 (2006) (on file with the author).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Samuel Walker & Vic W. Bumphus, The Effectiveness of Civilian Review:
Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian Review of the Police, 11
AM. J. POLICE 1, 19 (1992).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS, NICOLE J. HENDERSON, & CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIZ,
CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING? THE
PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE 40 (2005), available at http://www.vera.org/
download?file=87/277_530.pdf (discussing efforts made by the City of Pittsburgh to
end federal oversight of its police department).
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governmental authority to “engage in a pattern or practice of conduct
by law enforcement . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
63
United States.” If the attorney general concludes that cities are
64
violating the law, he may seek injunctive relief. If the court finds
that the municipality has engaged in a pattern or practice of illegal
conduct, it issues an order that places some or all aspects of the police
65
department’s operation under the Department of Justice.
This authority of the federal government to take control of the
operations of a local police department has been likened to the
intervention of the federal government in civil rights cases involving
school desegregation, employment discrimination, and prison66
condition cases. Since Congress adopted 42 U.S.C. § 14141 in 1994,
the Department of Justice has used the authority granted it by the
67
statute sparingly to correct police malfeasance, opting instead to use
the threat of injunctive relief to exact compliance and reforms from
68
local police.
Threatening a lawsuit has become such a fixture of § 14141 that
some commentators suggest the Department of Justice formally
69
institutionalize the practice. American cities, reluctant to tangle with
the expansive authority of the Department of Justice, are often eager
to establish or strengthen existing civilian oversight agencies in order
to be able to present plausible evidence of a concern for the constitu-

63. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2005).
64. Id.
65. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration
in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489,
493 (2008) (“In practice, DOJ has initiated what some experts consider only a
‘paucity’ of lawsuits, all of which have been resolved via court-enforced consent
decrees.”).
66. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1402 (2000).
67. Walker, supra note 55, at 4–5.
68. Id. at 4–6. Walker discusses several American cities (including Pittsburgh,
Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Washington D.C.) that entered into consent decrees or
memoranda of understanding with the Department of Justice when faced with a
threat of injunction. Minneapolis also went through a similar process of dealing with
the specter of a Department of Justice suit under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and it responded
by agreeing to federally mediated negations with community representatives to come
up with a multi-year agreement to achieve police reforms. David Chanen, Police
Mediation Pact to Be Signed: The Agreement Between Police and Mediators Covers Issues
Between Law Enforcers and Community Groups, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), Dec. 4, 2003,
at 1B.
69. Simmons, supra note 65, at 490.
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70

tional rights of their citizens.
Municipalities can also face liability for police misconduct under
71
a claim made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In City of Canton v.
Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted § 1983 to make cities
liable when there is evidence of “deliberate indifference” in the
training schemes of the police department to the rights of the
72
citizens. Lower courts have interpreted Harris to mean that police
departments not only must avoid a deliberate indifference in training,
but they must also avoid a deliberate indifference in investigating
73
allegations of police misconduct. Again, civilian oversight has been
seen as a way of protecting municipalities from the burden of federal
74
litigation or oversight.
C. The Challenges and Flaws of Civilian Oversight
Perhaps the most illuminating and damning weakness of the civilian oversight system has been its inability to prove that its efforts
75
actually result in a decrease in police misconduct. And a corollary
flaw of civilian oversight agencies is their inability to require discip76
line. Few, if any, civilian review agencies have the power to require
the imposition of discipline. Instead, the agencies send the result of
their investigation and adjudication to the chief of police, who makes
the final determination as to whether the police officer should be

70. CHRISTOPHER STONE, TODD FOGLESONG, & CHRISTINE M. COLE, POLICING LOS
ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 2 (2009),
available
at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/Harvard_LAPD_Report.p
df.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) (holding government agencies liable for “the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws. . . .”).
72. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
73. Hazel Glenn Beh, Municipal Liability for Failure to Investigate Citizen Complaints
Against Police, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 209, 225 (1998) (“Lower courts instantly
extended Canton . . . to claims based upon a municipality’s inadequate system of . . .
reviewing police misconduct. When challenging the adequacy of citizen complaint
procedures, plaintiffs typically allege that the failure to . . . resolve citizen complaints .
. . amounts to a policy of deliberate indifference to the need for police supervision.”).
74. Id.
75. Walker, supra note 55, at 22–23 (“Many external oversight agencies have
been weak, ineffective, poorly led, and have not provided either satisfactory service to
individual complainants or had any scientifically measurable effect on police
misconduct.”).
76. Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Citizen Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 653, 653 n.12 (2004).
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77

held accountable for his or her misconduct. However, scholars tend
to agree that this approach is appropriate because it does not disrupt
the important command structure of a police department where the
chief of police retains his or her authority, in part, by being seen as
78
the powerful, final arbiter of acceptable police conduct. Chiefs of
police exercise their independent judgment liberally, using their
79
authority to trump the investigations of the oversight agency.
Another challenge often faced by civilian oversight agencies is
the inability to disclose the results of their investigations and adjudica80
tions. It is frequently the case that a police officer’s personnel
records are considered non-public data and the allegations against the
officer and the contents of the investigation fall under the legally
81
protected categories of private information. Investigations, hearings,
and adjudications are usually kept away from the public except in
82
cases of very egregious misconduct.
For example, the California Supreme Court held in 2006 that it
was a violation of state statute to publicly disclose information
contained in administrative appeals of discipline imposed on police
officers—operating to cut off nearly all public disclosure of the
83
decisions of civilian oversight boards. California’s civilian oversight
84
agencies lobbied the California legislature to pass a statute that
would reverse the ruling, but those efforts failed when law enforce-

77. Bobb, supra note 38, at 163.
78. Livingston, supra note 76, at 653 n.12 (“Most scholars who have considered
the subject have concluded that this limitation on the scope of citizen involvement is
appropriate, lest the authority of the police chief and the chief’s responsibility for
officer performance be undermined in a way that could ultimately prove detrimental
to accountability. . . .”).
79. Rachel Fields & Steve Miletich, Cities Diverge in How They Police the Police,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 22, 2007, at A1 (drawing analogies between the chiefs of police of
Minneapolis and Seattle having failed to issue adequate discipline on police officers
guilty of misconduct).
80. Perino, supra note 26, at 392.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288, 288 (Cal. 2006).
Although Copley Press argued that public scrutiny of disciplinary decisions fostered
public confidence in the law enforcement system, the court reasoned that other
public policy interests were also at stake favoring confidentiality, including “protecting complainants and witnesses against recrimination or retaliation, protecting peace
officers from publication of frivolous or unwarranted charges, and maintaining
confidence in law enforcement agencies by avoiding premature disclosure of
groundless claims of police misconduct.” Id. at 305.
84. National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, Resources,
supra note 8.
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85

ment unions launched a counter-effort.
In some instances, the outcome of a case is not even disclosed to
the person who filed the complaint, as he or she is considered a
member of the public and ineligible to access the police officer’s
86
private personnel information.
For example, the Minnesota
Department of Administration, an agency charged with interpreting
and enforcing the state’s data practices laws, has held that “it would
violate an officer’s rights if the [Minneapolis Civilian Police Review
Authority] disclosed to a complainant, absent the data subject’s
consent, that his/her complaint was in whole or in part not sus87
tained.”
Commentators have suggested that such a lack of transparency
has a chilling effect on the complainant’s willingness to go through
88
the effort of filing a complaint with the agency. However, citizen
oversight agencies are not barred from releasing summary data about
89
the outcomes of cases. Such disclosures usually take the form of data
and statistics about trends within the police department —
information that is so broad in scope that it cannot be tied back to a
90
single police officer. Such disclosures can be distributed to the
media and to community groups; and they often serve as a report card
on the police department that police chiefs and municipal lawmakers
91
use to inform policy decisions with regard to the police department.
Community faith in civilian oversight also appears to be hampered by community perceptions of the oversight agencies themselves. Swearing-contest complaints (where both the officer and the
complainant allege foul language) often land at civilian oversight
agencies, and the complaint often comes down to one party’s word
92
against the other’s. Without dispositive evidence, the agency is
85. Patrick McGreevy, Effort to Open Files on Police Thwarted, L.A. TIMES, June 27,
2007, at 1.
86. See, e.g., CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW AUTH., CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, ANNUAL REPORT
2007, at 32 (2007), available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cra/docs/
CRAannualreport2007.pdf.
87. Minnesota Department of Administration Advisory Opinion: 08-020 (2008),
available at http://www.ipad.state.mn.us/opinions/2008/08020.html.
88. Perino, supra note 26, at 392.
89. Walker & Bumphus, supra note 60, at 20.
90. See, e.g., 2009 MPLS. CIVILIAN POLICE REV. AUTH., 3RD QUARTER REP., available
at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cra/docs/CRA_2009_3rd_Quarter_Report.pdf.
91. Bobb, supra note 38, at 161. “The public monitoring reports, which address
the fundamental excessive force and integrity issues in policing, are calculated to
foster a constructive, task-oriented, and problem-solving dialog [sic], stripped of
ideology and rhetoric.” Id.
92. Walker, supra note 55, at 24.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/14

14

Weinbeck: Note: Watching the Watchmen: Lessons for Federal Law Enforcement

1320

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

reluctant to sustain the citizen’s complaint and the agency’s record of
holding officers accountable begins to look no more impressive than
93
the police department’s internal affairs unit.
Douglas Perez also observes that civilian review boards may fall
short of their potential because the citizen adjudicators—after
spending time with police officers— may begin to adopt the police
officer’s perspective in the same way that internal affairs investigators
94
supposedly do, leading to leniency with errant cops.
Further complicating the reputations of civilian review boards is
the chance that the adjudicators may be made up of “vociferous,
radical elements of the community . . . [who use] complaint hearings
and policy hearings as platforms to espouse political rhetoric aimed at
the police department, at police in America, and even at ‘the
95
establishment’ generally.”
Annette Gordon-Reed notes that civilian oversight is also challenged merely by its status as an overseer of another agency: it is only
natural to chafe at being “overseen,” because this imputes an
assumption that the person under scrutiny is prone to dishonesty or
96
incompetence.
She observes further that “only a minority of
97
agencies are ever subjected to this type of outside scrutiny.”
The unique nature of law enforcement seems to deepen the sting
of oversight: not only are police officers highly trained practitioners,
they work in a field where they regularly face life-threatening dangers
98
to keep the public safe. Rebelling at the idea of non-sworn watchmen—who presumably have never faced the dangerous situations
that police officers face on a daily basis—appears to be both natural
99
and justifiable.
D. A Halftime Summation
As the foregoing suggests, civilian oversight is not a cure-all. But
the numerous and serious flaws of civilian review have not operated to
93. Id.
94. PEREZ, supra note 52, at 155.
95. Id. at 155–56.
96. Annette Gordon-Reed, Watching the Protectors: Independent Oversight of
Municipal Law Enforcement Agencies, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87, 98 (1995).
97. Id.
98. See ANTHONY BOUZA, POLICE UNBOUND: CORRUPTION, ABUSE, AND HEROISM BY
THE BOYS IN BLUE (2001); MICHAEL W. QUINN, WALKING WITH THE DEVIL: THE POLICE
CODE OF SILENCE (2005) (offering excellent narrative accounts of the dangers of
policing).
99. BOUZA, supra note 98, at 257-59.
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stem its growth. About eighty percent of the police departments in
100
the fifty largest American cities have some form of oversight, and
101
civilian review continues to expand domestically and internationally.
Further expansion of civilian review would likely benefit from an
approach that is more responsive to the mistakes of the past. Many of
the challenges discussed above that have burdened civilian review
appear to be avoidable simply by taking certain steps at the front end:
selecting the civilian overseers with great care, mandating a robust
disciplinary requirement, and creating systems that can track the
success of the oversight agency.
As Sam Walker has noted, federal law enforcement agencies have
102
been “conspicuously absent from the oversight movement.” Could
the federal exception to civilian review be overcome if oversight
agencies had a better arsenal of fail-safes? Regardless of the reason
for federal non-participation in civilian review, it appears that the
current approach to addressing misconduct by federal officers is
inadequate.
III. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OVERSIGHT TODAY
A. Misconduct is Present
The FBI has been at the center of many firestorms for agent misconduct. A 2004 study by the bureau revealed that FBI agents had
been found to have committed rape, attempted murder, bribery, and
103
extortion.
Other reports have revealed a disparity between how
discipline is imposed when senior-level agents commit acts of
104
misconduct versus junior-level agents.
The agency has also gained notoriety for its approach to whistleblowers, and the need for reform has been well publicized, especially
105
by Iowa Senator Charles Grassley.
In 2007, a federal jury in
Minneapolis awarded Jane Turner, a 25-year veteran of the FBI,
100. WALKER, supra note 3, at 40.
101. Id. at 41.
102. Id.
103. Jerry Seper, FBI Disciplined 77 Agents Over 14-Year Period: Crimes Included Bribery
and Rape, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at A5.
104. Dan Eggen, Report: Brass Behaving Badly: Most Managers Got Lighter Discipline
Than Subordinates, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2003, at A8.
105. See, e.g., Dan Browning, Accounting Sought from FBI Director: Iowa Sen. Grassley
Wants to Know How Many Supervisors Have Been Disciplined for Retaliation, and if Three in
Particular Played a Part in a St. Paul Agent’s Case, STAR TRIB.(MINNEAPOLIS), Feb. 28,
2007, at 4B.
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$565,000 after she prevailed on claims of retaliation by superiors.
Turner alleged that her superiors required her to transfer to another
office in retaliation for an equal-employment opportunity lawsuit she
had filed, and for reporting an FBI agent who took a Tiffany crystal
globe found in the wreckage of the World Trade Center towers after
107
September 11, 2001.
Advocates of whistleblower reform have been disappointed by the
actions of President Barack Obama, who promised to reform federal
108
whistleblowing policies when he was elected president. But when
the president signed an economic stimulus package in February 2009,
109
whistleblower provisions had been stripped from the law.
B. How FBI Oversight is Currently Carried Out
The FBI has nearly 33,000 employees, almost 14,000 of which are
110
special agents.
The agency’s system for handling complaints is
aimed almost exclusively at complaints arising from within the agency
111
(that is, complaints raised by other FBI employees). The agency’s
website provides no information for a member of the public to file a
112
complaint.
When an FBI employee raises a concern about another employee’s conduct, the complaint triggers a multi-step investigative
113
process.
When an FBI official receives a complaint, the agency’s
policy requires that the complaint be sent to the Department of
114
Justice’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). Normally, the OIG will
refer the case back to the FBI to carry out the investigation, unless the
complaint involves criminal misconduct or high-level FBI administra106. Jerry Seeper, Senator Presses FBI for Disciplining, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at
A4.
107. Id.
108. Joe Davidson, Whistleblower Advocates Disappointed but Determined, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 2009.
109. Id.
110. Federal Bureau of Investigation, About Us—Quick Facts,
http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
111. GRIFFIN B. BELL & LEE COLWELL, STUDY OF THE FBI’S OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 12 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/opr/
bellreport.pdf.
112. FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation Homepage, http://www.fbi.gov (last
visited Jan. 28, 2010).
113. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS DIV., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, Office of the Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division,
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM, (May 2009),
at ii, available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/e0902/final.pdf.
114. Id. at 2.
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115

tors. Cases that are referred back to the FBI are sent to the agency’s
Internal Investigations Section in the Inspections Division, where the
investigation is carried out by either internal affairs staff or by staff
116
members in the field who are assigned to the special investigation.
Upon completion of the investigation, the case is sent to the FBI’s
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and the OPR decides
117
what —if any—discipline to impose.
The FBI’s complaint investigation process structurally resembles
the process that a local police department would follow for an
118
internal affairs investigation.
Congressional oversight has been another, frequently employed
method of overseeing federal intelligence and law enforcement
119
agencies.
However, congressional review of the work of federal
agencies has been problematic: first, because it tends to be political;
and second, because it tends to be unpredictable. As Sidney Shapiro
notes in his commentary on reduced effectiveness of congressional
oversight of regulatory policy:
Congress employs a variety of monitoring and reporting
methods, but the efficacy of those approaches has been limited because . . . they have been tied to a fire alarm approach. . . . In fire alarm oversight, legislators depend on
third parties to call to their attention agency policies that
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPT. INTERNAL AFFAIRS UNIT, CITY OF
MINNEAPOLIS,
2008
ANNUAL
REPORT
9
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/about/docs/IADAnnualReport2008.pdf. In
Minneapolis, a complaint to internal affairs is first reviewed by the city attorney to
determine whether the alleged misconduct merits criminal charges. See id. at 11. If
the city attorney declines pursuing charges, the case goes back to internal affairs
where officers assigned to the unit conduct an investigation. Id. Upon completion of
the investigation, the internal affairs unit may propose discipline. Id. Imposition of
discipline must be approved by the chief of police or an administrator selected by the
chief. Id. The process used by the FBI is also roughly similar to the oversight process
used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). See A. John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet
Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel?, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL. 201, 210
(2008). The CIA complaint process differs from the FBI internal oversight process
because a complaint to the CIA’s Office of General Counsel may lead the complaining employee to being called to testify before a congressional committee. See id. at
211.
119. Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “The Broken Branch”, 89 B.U.
L.REV. 765, 773 (2009) (“Congress has repeatedly turned to the oversight and
investigative powers of its committees to police the executive branch. And, at least
anecdotally, when Congress wields its oversight powers forcefully, it can lead to
genuine changes in public policy.”).
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deviate from congressional preferences. . . . Fire-alarm oversight has the potential to generate favorable publicity without requiring a substantial time commitment from
legislators, which permitted them to emphasize more politically profitable activities such as passing legislation. This
120
approach did not result in systematic oversight, however.
Political partisanship is also thought to contribute to the unpre121
dictability of congressional oversight. In December 2005, the New
York Times reported on unauthorized wiretaps by the National Security
122
Agency (NSA). At the time, a Republican president occupied the
White House and a Republican majority operated in both houses of
123
Congress. Political pressure exerted by both the executive branch
and Republican party leaders stifled congressional oversight of the
124
NSA’s actions.
Congress eventually passed the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, which greatly loosened the restrictions on the NSA
125
to seek approval before conducting a wiretap.
In some respects, Congress operates as a form of civilian oversight since congressional representatives are not law enforcement
126
agents; they are non-sworn civilians who are in a position (by virtue
of their power to control commerce and declare war) to oversee the
law enforcement and intelligence-gathering activities of the govern127
ment. However, Congress’s interest in providing robust oversight
has ebbed and flowed throughout history, with robust congressional
120. Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994).
121. Kriner, supra note 119, at 784.
122. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
123. Although this incident involved a Republican president and a Republican
Congress, I found no literature that would suggest that intelligence misconduct has
anything to with whether either party controls both the executive and legislative
branches and, if so, which party controls.
124. Tara M. Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An
Analysis of Congressional Oversight During an Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 149, 171 (2006).
125. Id.
126. See PATRICK LEAHY, CHARLES GRASSLEY & ARLEN SPECTER, FBI OVERSIGHT IN THE
107TH CONGRESS BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: FISA IMPLEMENTATION FAILURES,
4–5(2003), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030200fisafailures.pdf
(FBI and the individual liberties of citizens are both benefited by the external
oversight of Congress).
127. David Everett Colton, Comment, Speaking Truth to Power: Intelligence Oversight
in an Imperfect World, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 590 (1988) (“Congress’s right to oversee
the Executive’s conduct of intelligence activities is rooted in the congressional powers
enumerated in the Constitution, and in Congress’s broad investigatory power as
recognized by the Court.”).
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action usually coming in reaction to cataclysmic failures of the law
128
enforcement (and intelligence) community.
Although the judicial branch of government may offer some
measure of oversight to the FBI, its reach is often limited by statutory
129
deference to security-based priorities. Constitutional challenges to
legislation, such as the PATRIOT Act, may curb law enforcement
130
wrongdoing by bringing about systemic change. But other types of
efforts to seek judicial redress—through tort litigation, for example —often fail to work as preventative measures because governmental leaders usually lack the coordination to respond systemically to the
131
lawsuits.
As Samuel Walker observes, “Academic studies of the
strategy [of tort litigation] have generally found little direct impact on
police reform. The flaw in the strategy appears to be the assumption
that public officials will act in a rational and coordinated manner in
132
response to rising litigation costs.”
Moreover, criminal prosecutions of errant law enforcement offic133
ers are also considered to be ineffective.
Prosecutors —by the
nature of their work —have close relationships with law enforcement

128. Compare Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State:
Congressional Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721, 725 (2007) (“[The few past
instances] of congressional action followed a similar pattern: long periods of
executive autonomy punctuated by short bursts of congressional oversight grounded
in public revelations of impropriety or illegality in the Intelligence Community.”),
with Colton, supra note 127, at 582–89 (describing three phases of congressional
oversight from the 1970s to the 1990s that roughly correspond to the three phases of
the interrelationship between the executive and congressional powers described by
Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
129. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 559 (2006) (observing that judicial oversight of
document-production regimes available to the FBI under the PATRIOT Act largely
bar judicial oversight because the only threshold requirement for a document
demand is the FBI’s self-certification that it is acting in good faith); Daniel J. Solove,
Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1296 (2004)
(observing that electronic surveillance laws do not give the judicial branch enough
oversight authority).
130. See Hillary & Kubasek, supra note 20, at 66 (discussing a constitutional
challenge to section 215 of the PATRIOT Act).
131. Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 775–76 (1993) (“[C]ity
governments approach civil suits against individual officers or the police department
defensively, rather than addressing the larger social issues underlying the suits. Local
officials are constrained by social, political and economic factors that militate against
any active pursuit of police reform.”).
132. Walker, supra note 55, at 18.
133. Walker, supra note 55, at 19.
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134

officers.
Proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt is a
difficult task given the easy defense for a law enforcement agent that
135
he or she faced a physical risk. And, finally, juries and judges tend
136
to be highly deferential to law enforcement officers.
C. The President’s Intelligence Oversight Board: A Closer Fit?
According to Amnesty International, the FBI is not subject to any
137
While this is functionally true, it is technically
civilian oversight.
incorrect in at least one respect: in 1956, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower established the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory
138
Board (PFIAB), and, in 1976, President Gerald Ford established a
subcommittee of the board known as the Intelligence Oversight
139
Board.
PFIAB’s purpose is to assess the “quality, quantity, and
adequacy of intelligence collection, of analysis and estimates, and of
140
counterintelligence and other intelligence activities.”
The Intelligence Oversight Board was a reaction by President
Ford to public disclosure of domestic spying operations by the CIA
aimed at disrupting antiwar efforts during the Nixon administra141
tion. After the disclosures, President Ford appointed Vice President
Nelson Rockefeller to head a commission charged with investigating
142
the CIA’s domestic spying operations. The Rockefeller Commission
reported back to the President with several recommendations for

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RIGHTS FOR ALL 25 (1998),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/ (go to bottom of page and type “AMR
51/035/1998” into the “AI Index” search field).
138. Christine E. Hinrichs, Student Essay, Flying Under the Radar of an Unnecessary
Intelligence Watchdog: A Review of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 5109, 5110 (2009).
139. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. § 90 (1976).
140. Exec. Order No. 12,863, 3 C.F.R. §§ 632, 632–33 (1993). Just as the
Intelligence Oversight Board has been accused of suffering from shortcomings, the
PFIAB also has been under fire because it has no requirement of regular meetings,
the appointees to the board are political allies of the President and do not necessarily
have a particular skill in the intelligence field, and it has a history of tension with
members of the intelligence community. Hinrichs, supra note 138, at 5113–14.
Because the Intelligence Oversight Board is a subcommittee of the PFIAB (and
because its members not only have oversight of intelligence-gathering operations, but
also the more controversial issue of acts of intelligence-gathering misconduct), it is
unlikely to have a reputation better than that of the PFIAB as a whole.
141. See Ford, supra note 128, at 739.
142. Ford, supra note 128, at 745.
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bringing more oversight to the intelligence committee.
As a
consequence, the President signed an executive order regulating
144
multiple aspects of American intelligence-gathering services.
Any member who qualifies to serve on the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board can also serve on the Intelligence
145
Advisory Board. To be appointed to the foreign intelligence board,
“one must only be a trustworthy and distinguished citizen and be
appointed by the President—knowledge of intelligence issues is not a
146
prerequisite.” The purpose of the Intelligence Advisory Board is to
inform the President and the Attorney General of intelligence
147
misconduct.
During the Clinton administration, the board disapproved of the
administration’s policy of allowing arm shipments from Iran to
Bosnia, and it complained that the CIA had a policy of employing
148
known torturers and killers as informants in Latin America. During
the first two years of the administration of President George W. Bush,
the Intelligence Oversight Board was mute because the President had
149
not appointed its membership.
President Bill Clinton armed the Intelligence Oversight Board
with the authority to report misconduct by intelligence officers
directly to the Attorney General, but that authority was removed by
President Bush in February 2008 and, instead, misconduct was
150
reported directly to the President.
To the satisfaction of some
commentators, President Obama recently signed an executive order
restoring the board’s power to report misconduct directly to the

143. Id.
144. Id. (“[Executive Order 11,905 was] the first publicly known regulation
concerning the operation and function of the Intelligence Community.”).
145. Exec. Order No. 11,905, supra note 139.
146. Hinrichs, supra note 138, at 5110. Executive Order 11,905 calls for the
members of the three-member Intelligence Oversight Board to “be from outside the
Government and be qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of
background and experience.” Exec. Order No. 11,905, supra note 139.
147. John Solomon, In Intelligence World, A Mute Watchdog, WASH. POST, July 15,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/14/
AR2007071400862.html.
148. Id.
149. Id. (reporting that once the members of the Intelligence Oversight Board
were appointed by President Bush, the body issued no findings for five-and-a-half
years, despite public revelations by the FBI of hundreds of acts of intelligencegathering misconduct).
150. Charlie Savage, Obama Order Strengthens Spy Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2009, at A16.
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151

Attorney General.
However, once misconduct is reported to the
Attorney General by the Intelligence Oversight Board, no investigative
152
action is required by the Justice Department. Moreover, the board
was appointed nearly a year after President Obama took office, and it
153
is still unclear what its modus operandi will be.
IV. CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
A. Civilian Oversight Has Been Met With Suspicion But Has Promise
With the expansion of the authority of federal law enforcement
agents, the federal government’s authority to affect the rights of U.S.
citizens has expanded greatly. As noted above, this expansion in
power has been accompanied by what appears to be an increase in
violations of individual rights. Few Americans would have believed a
decade ago that today our society would be engaging in a serious
debate about the efficacy of torture and the legitimacy of wiretaps.
Issues that had long appeared to have been settled in favor of
individual rights are in play again.
The national security arguments for the expansion of federal law
enforcement authority are persuasive. But as the balance of power
shifts away from the people and towards the policymakers at Langley
and Quantico, calls for greater oversight are also persuasive. Federal
policymakers have been remiss in not establishing new avenues of
oversight and strengthening existing avenues.
Historically, civilian oversight of law enforcement has been
treated with suspicion by the FBI. J. Edgar Hoover, the former head
of the FBI, said that he thought communists were behind civilian
154
review boards.
The Intelligence Oversight Board has largely
operated as window dressing; although President Obama has restored
151. Id. (“Suzanne E. Spaulding, a former deputy counsel at the Central
Intelligence Agency . . . praised Mr. Obama for partly rolling [President Bush’s
changes] back. ‘What this does is to restore some of the independence to this advisory
board, and that’s very important,’ she said.”).
152. Id.
153. Josh Gerstein, Under the Radar: Where’s the PIAB, POLITICO, Jan. 7, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0110/Wheres_the_PIAB.html.
154. PEREZ, supra note 52, at 125 (“As Hoover put it, ‘Their altruistic mouthings
are a front and a sham[,] for they have already prejudged law enforcement as an
enemy to their nihilistic cause. Their real objective is to intimidate and harass
police.’”). It is ironic, however, to consider Hoover’s comments in light of the role
that the FBI often plays today investigating claims of police officer misconduct that
have been referred to the bureau by local prosecutors wary of appearing to have a
conflict of interest.
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some of its prior power, even at the zenith of its authority, the board
155
commanded little respect.
However, an oversight scheme that takes into account the pitfalls
that have befallen municipal agencies may have a greater chance of
success. Unfortunately, there has been a paucity of commentary on
creating a mechanism for civilian oversight of federal intelligence and
156
law enforcement.
One commentator, in proposing a model of
civilian oversight for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
suggests a “bipartisan commission made up of Presidential appointees
[that] would be responsible for investigating individual complaints of
civil rights violations by immigration officials or customs agents and
157
making disciplinary and policy recommendations.”
B. The Need for Civilian Oversight
The individual rights being threatened by the expansion of federal law enforcement authority are deeply personal. Installing a
robust system of civilian oversight makes philosophical sense: when
the most precious individual rights are being affected, it becomes
imperative for the citizens to be at the table to influence the conversation.
155. Daniel B. Silver, The Uses and Misuses of Intelligence Oversight, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L
L. 7, 14–15 (1988) (“To date, however, the public image of [the Intelligence
Oversight Board] fails to inspire confidence that it is a strong organ of internal
executive branch oversight. The Board is made up of part-time members and has
virtually no staff. It is hard to conceive, given the limitations on its resources, that it
can play a forceful role.”). Notably, Silver’s comments about the Intelligence
Oversight Board echo the complaints that commentators often have about local
civilian oversight boards. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 55, at 23–24 (“External
oversight agencies fail for a variety of reasons unrelated to the underlying concept of
citizen oversight. Some fail because they lack the authority to accomplish their stated
objectives. . . . Others fail because of a lack of resources: e.g., not having sufficient
number of investigators relative to the size of the police department and the
complaint caseload. . . . Others fail because of a lack of political support. . . .”).
156. But see Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Keeping an Eye on the I.N.S.: A Case for Civilian
Review of Uncivil Conduct, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 5 (1994) (describing a scheme for installing
a system of civilian oversight at the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service).
157. Id. at 16–17. Ultimately, Rosenbaum concludes that civilian review would
serve as a good solution for the Immigration and Naturalization Service if it is
perceived as “accessible, confidential, prompt, impartial and even-handed.” Id. at 42.
These standards compare favorably with the code of ethics that the National
Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement calls for in a civilian oversight
agency. National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement Code of
Ethics, http://nacole.org/images/stories/pdf/nacolecodeethics.pdf (last visited Mar.
16, 2010). Among the requirements it includes are: outreach, confidentiality,
professional excellence, and respectful and unbiased treatment. Id.
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The current system of confronting FBI misconduct appears to
operate with a pre-9/11 mindset. And even by that standard, it is still
lacking.
While civilian oversight does not offer a perfect solution, it does
offer some signposts. Foremost, civilian oversight is a means of
bolstering the faith of citizens in the functions of their government. If
the federal government were to establish an agency unconnected
with, and un-beholden to, any federal law enforcement agency, it
would likely contribute to a reduced cynicism about the anti-terrorist
efforts of government.
C. A Proposed System of Federal Civilian Oversight
A federal system of civilian oversight should exploit the best practices of the municipal oversight models and abandon —or at least
minimize — the practices that have burdened the local systems.
Recalling the discussion above, civilian oversight appears to be at its
zenith when it operates to call attention to gross misconduct,
encourage political pressure for reform, and create the perception of
unbiased, direct citizen oversight. And civilian review is hampered
when public disclosure is limited, discipline for misconduct is lax, and
158
the board members are unqualified for the work.
With these
attributes in mind, what might a civilian oversight model look like at
the federal level?
Ideally, the agency would be made up of a board of citizens who
have been thoroughly trained in the work of the agency. The board
would be structured to allow for areas of specialization, and the
members would be given security clearances to view classified
information that may be contained in the complaints.
To prevent the political conflicts that have sometimes plagued
159
municipal boards, board members would be selected for four-year
terms, and the terms would expire in odd-numbered years. These
changes avoid the politicization of the major election cycles. Half of
the members would be congressional appointees and half would be
appointed by the President.
To aid in systematic data-gathering and reporting, the agency
would be an arm of one of the government’s auditing functions—
possibly the Government Accounting Office. Funding for the
158. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 186–87 (discussing the attributes of effective
civilian oversight).
159. Id. at 9.
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oversight agency would be statutorily guaranteed.
Alternatively, a system of civilian oversight might be achieved by
expanding the auspices of the Intelligence Oversight Board. Since
the board is established through an enabling executive order,
legislative wrangling is avoided and an operational system could be
implemented more quickly. However, without a legislative mandate,
the Intelligence Oversight Board rests on the goodwill of the President. A board created by statute (negotiated between the White
House and Congress) may have a better base for long-term survival
and effectiveness.
Given the complex and specialized nature of the complaints, it
would probably be infeasible for any civilian oversight agency to have
its own investigative staff. Instead, the civilian oversight board would
serve as an auditor to investigations being carried out by the law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. All complaints under
investigation would be dual-filed with the board, and the members
would select which cases would undergo a board review.
As noted above, the imposition of discipline is a key consideration. If the board finds an investigation or an imposition of discipline
inadequate, it should have the authority to require the law enforcement or intelligence agency head to reconsider the case. If the
agency head makes no changes to the disposition, he or she would be
required to provide the board with an explanation of the decision. If
the board is still dissatisfied with the outcome, it would have the
authority to refer the case to the President and to the appropriate
congressional committee for further action.
The board would also establish a federal system for filing citizen
complaints. No matter which federal law enforcement agency the
citizen interacted with, the board would serve as a one-stop clearinghouse for complaint filing. Complaints could be filed on the web. All
individuals who are taken into federal custody or subjected to federal
investigation would be apprised of the existence of the board and
given an opportunity to file a complaint.
D. Applying Civilian Oversight to Intelligence Services
In the post-9/11 world, the U.S. government has deliberately
attacked the traditional wall of separation between federal law
160
enforcement and intelligence-gathering activities. Today, the FBI
160. Craig S. Lerner, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign
Intelligence Gathering and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 493, 496 (2003).
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regularly engages in intelligence-gathering work to protect national
161
security and has run into corollary problems with abuses of power.
A former general counsel to the CIA and the National Security
Agency has concluded that, absent major changes to the congressional approach to oversight, progress on oversight reforms are unlikely to
be realized: “Nor can progress be achieved as long as the Congress
misuses its oversight role as a point of attack on executive branch
primacy in foreign relations, and misuses the oversight committees as
the forum for partisan foreign policy disputes with the Administra162
tion.”
Consequently, it bears mentioning that, while civilian oversight
has traditionally been applied strictly to law enforcement, there is
little to suggest that its use could not extend to oversight of intelligence-gathering activities. Indeed, given the blurring of lines within
the FBI between its traditional law enforcement roles and its developing intelligence-gathering roles, it would seem counterintuitive not to
apply an oversight model holistically.
V. CONCLUSION
Civilian oversight has been met with many challenges in America’s cities. But, with more than 100 civilian oversight agencies in the
United States, it appears to be a solution that provides enough
community satisfaction to justify its continued existence.
In addition, oversight mechanisms that the federal government
currently employs are insufficient to stand up to the expansive
authority that has been granted to America’s law enforcement
agencies. Given the inconsistent results that come from each branch
of the government when trying to oversee the nation’s law enforcement and domestic intelligence-gathering activities, new approaches
are needed. A system of civilian oversight will provide some measure
of satisfaction to a public deeply concerned for the stewardship of its
civil liberties.

161.
162.

See Solomon, supra note 10, at A1.
Silver, supra note 155, at 17.
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